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Since the 1980s, transnational capital has been expanding, like the 
electronic media, all over the world, and thus the third-world coun-
tries, including China, fall into a dilemma: while opposing the expan-
sion of transnational capital, they have to use foreign capital to develop 
their local economy and follow the route of transnational capitalism. 
However, they defend nationalism as well, recognizing that it has strate-
gic signifi cance in the struggle against the Western domination of econ-
omy and culture; they take nationalism as an effective form of resistance 
to the process of globalization and the ideology that goes with trans-
national capital, providing a critical understanding of the new forms 
of multinational geopolitical organizations. Therefore, in the process of 
globalization, we should give priority to the exploration of the politi-
cal, economical, and cultural structure of a society on the basis of a new 
global system. In other words, we should pay attention to the positive 
features of national culture and national psychology, and focus on the 
changing relations among those features or between different citizens. 
In what follows I will explore what is happening in the Chinese cultural 
space, which reveals polarities of the celebratory and the apocalyptic 
towards globalization and indicates that we cannot imagine any sort of 
local identity outside or protected against the global fl ow of capital.
Globalization as a term was not popular in China until the late twen-
tieth century when the Communist Party of China fi nally took an affi r-
mative attitude towards the world market system after almost ten years’ 
hesitation and frustration at the false dichotomy between a market econ-
omy and the socialist system. With the Party’s gradual acceptance of the 
market system, and with the increasing indistinguishability of the eco-
nomic from the political, globalization became a buzzword at the turn 
of the century with unprecedented force, bringing about a nation-wide 
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expectation for a new China that will be economically wealthier and 
politically more powerful than ever before. Phrases such as “economic 
development,” “a new historical era,” and “construction of a better life” 
began to appear in the media with higher frequency, especially after the 
sixteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Despite 
all anxieties and debates over Chinese modernity, China is becoming 
one of the largest potential markets and manufacturing centers of the 
world, starting to merge into the global market system after shaking 
off its self-assured ethnocentrism. This can be evidenced in the increas-
ing number of transnational corporations in big cities throughout the 
country since the beginning of the 1980s. In the city of Beijing alone, 
more than 400 international corporations have set up subsidiary offi ces, 
bringing about a rapid emergence of enterprise capitalism. In Shanghai, 
when the international forum called “China in the Next Fifty Years” was 
held in 1999, 45 private planes of multinational corporations landed 
at the Shanghai-Pudong Airport. When the General Secretary of the 
Party was invited to address the opening ceremony of the conference on 
September 27, he emphasized that differences in social systems and po-
litical doctrines should be no obstacle to friendly exchanges and co-cor-
porations between China and the rest of the world, stressing the point 
that economic development should be one of the primary tasks on the 
national agenda. 
Indeed, globalization is understood in China in close association with 
the question of whether the country can bridge its gap with an inter-
national economic standard as soon as possible. However, this excessive 
emphasis on the economic aspect of globalization has caused a lot of de-
bates among intellectuals. Social critics, in particular, have been weighed 
down over the years by questions such as “Will economic globalization 
lead to cultural homogenization, which in turn obscures the national 
identity?” Equating globalization with Americanization and standard-
ization, some scholars believe that the powerful tendency towards a cap-
italist market system in China will inevitably lead to a complete loss of 
its cultural identity. On the other side of the spectrum, globalization is 
celebrated as a multifunctional mechanism that helps push China into a 
global structure of production and reproduction. 
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No doubt China has experienced momentous changes on different 
levels since the Communist Party of China adopted an open policy in 
the late 70s. Through promoting a household-based agriculture, the 
nation became stabilized because of the rapid increase of agricultural 
products. As everybody knows, 80% of the population in China were 
peasants, and so long as they had food to eat, the nation would escape 
serious trouble. Then the nation started its fi rst phase of the modern-
ization project and its economy began to build up steadily. And with 
the rapid growth of urbanization and increasing availability and use of 
modern communication technologies in the 90s, particularly after con-
sumerism was offi cially declared as an important “motivating [force] for 
the development of production,”1 the average citizen has been encour-
aged to believe that China is being “connected” with the developed sec-
tors of the world. Grasping globalization mainly as an economic phe-
nomenon, the Party maintains that socialism is a guiding principle in 
the country’s development in spite of an increasing awareness of various 
confl icts between a bureaucratic political system and the market system. 
Immediately after the great economic success in the 90s, the govern-
ment went all out to call for a common endeavor to catch up with the 
West. Foreign trade was expanded from 20 billion US dollars in the 
1960s to 360 billion in the late 90s, jumping to sixth place in the world 
trade market. “Made in China” evokes national pride and signifi es a 
cessation of the country’s exclusion from the world economic system. 
Though not comparable to well-informed westerners, the Chinese are 
obviously better informed than they used to be. Besides increasingly 
wide television ownership by households all over the country, more and 
more people in the developed areas are using modems to connect with 
the Internet; retrieving and sending e-mails and surfi ng cyberspace has 
almost become part of their routine activity, as an alternative to watch-
ing television. In company with the idea of a global information super-
highway, people are excited by the prospect of a global village. A survey 
conducted by CCTV shows that 10% of citizens are using the Internet 
for communication and commercial interactions; 72% know the World 
Cup; 44% know the Chicago Bulls; 39% know Michael Jordan; 51% 
long for a chance to visit foreign countries; global brands such as Coca-
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Cola, Panasonic, Marlboro, Hitachi, and Philips are so familiar to most 
of the Chinese in big cities that they have become mass-cultural icons. 
Although restricted to a small elite class, imported fruits and vegetables 
are always available in supermarkets regardless of season. In fact, in most 
big cities, people can fi nd a wider range of foreign foods on the shelves 
of supermarkets. And pastas, pizzas, burgers, and fries have long ceased 
to be regarded as unusual and have become everyday family foods. Thus 
food is becoming a global culture that exemplifi es the compression of 
international space. In short, the expansion of capitalism and the pro-
cess towards globalization in China makes itself most obvious as an eco-
nomically better way of life, a path championed by developed capitalist 
countries. The country has never experienced such an abrupt break with 
its own history and tradition. 
Anthony Giddens defi nes globalization as a consequence of modernity, 
characterized by “the intensifi cation of worldwide social relations which 
link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by 
A European-style café in Beijing. Photo: Wang Liya.
*ARIEL 34-1~1-150.indd   96 4/21/05   11:02:44 AM
97
Tr an s f o r m a t i on  and  Cr i s i s  i n  t h e  Ch ine s e  Cu l tu r a l  Spa c e
events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (64). Such an empha-
sis on the idea of global connectivity, including the intimacy between 
globalization and modernity is exactly what might be summarized as 
an important theme in China’s modernization project. Somewhat dif-
ferent, but related to this concept of connectivity, the familiar phrases 
“to connect with the world,” “to bridge the gap with world market,” 
and “think globally” best describe the mentality of the Chinese at the 
turn of the century. With the government’s persuasive rhetoric of, and 
promise for, “a better life” for its average citizens, globalization is mainly 
grasped as a lineal economic process that leads China towards a very 
developed stage. In living with all the ambiguities of American capital-
ism, the government sees economic globalization and cultural identity 
as opposed, and can only be unifi ed within the structure of Chinese 
modernization. Although the Sixteenth National Congress reiterates the 
Party as the sole engineer of the country’s modernization project, the 
Party Constitution makes some signifi cant adaptations to the new his-
torical situations, shifting its grand utopian vision of liberation to that 
of “a better life” for the average citizens under the Party’s leadership. 
Although the government tried to communicate the concept of “a better 
life” with specifi c items that defi ne the standard of “a comfortably-off 
family,” the average citizens have only secured a vague idea of what it 
really means except 800 US dollars per capita national income. Often, 
such a normalized (and idealized) image is expressed through activities 
of routine consumption and an increasing desire for commodities. 
One of the most exciting and frustrating topics among citizens in 
recent years is the loans and mortgage system in the housing market. 
People are encouraged by the government to “own” houses/fl ats via 
different forms of loans and mortgages. While feeling tempted, most 
families in cities are becoming more and more commercially pressured. 
Capitalism, which was associated with private ownership and exploi-
tation, is interpreted in this new historical situation as a better way of 
life. Despite a carefully controlled voice in the press, the power of cap-
ital is functioning as a force of enlightenment in China. This active 
adaptive outlook goes together with the Party’s renewed attitude to-
wards its own identity and composition. The newly revised version of 
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the Party Constitution makes it clear that while “the Communist Party 
of China is the vanguard of the working class, it is also the vanguard of 
the Chinese people and the Chinese nation.” Throughout its history, 
the Communist Party of China has been recognized as a legislative body 
based on a union of the workers and peasants. The revised Constitution 
signifi es some recognition of the signifi cant transformation in the Party’s 
composition. As many Marxist ideologies would remind us, the subject 
of labor and revolt has changed greatly since the 60s, transforming with 
it the composition of the proletariat—the proletariat as a broad catego-
ry should include all those whose labor is directly or indirectly exploit-
ed by capitalist norms of production and reproduction. In China this 
transformative consciousness appeared as early as 1978 when the Third 
Plenary Session of the Eleventh Party Congress launched the campaign 
of “thought emancipation.” Distantly related to this ideological move-
ment, there appeared some obvious changes in the Party’s components. 
More importantly, the Party began to accept self-employed entrepre-
neurs who applied for membership, which meant that the Party would 
Looking at models of new condominiums. Photo: Wang Liya.
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accept owners of private factories or companies, who hire workers and 
exploit their surplus value and thus could be regarded as new capitalists. 
Such a brave maneuver signals an honest recognition of social stratifi ca-
tion in China. Indeed, the structure of social class has undergone drastic 
change since the country started its fi rst stage of reform at the beginning 
of the 80s. Technicians of industries run by local people, administrative 
workers employed by foreign enterprises, self-employed workers and en-
trepreneurs, professionals of various kinds are increasing so rapidly that 
they form new social groups. With distinctive characteristics of their 
own, these groups and classes cut across the traditional category of “the 
industrial working class,” complicating the emergent phenomenon of 
social stratifi cation in contemporary China. 
If we take modernization as a process indicated by a migration of labor 
from agriculture to industry and postmodernization as one moving from 
manufacturing industry to service industry (entertainment, health care, 
education, fi nance, transportation, advertisement, etc), what is taking 
place in the economic zones of China is perhaps a postmodern social-
ism. With the gradual shift of focus from agriculture towards industry 
and service jobs, more and more peasants are becoming wage workers 
in big cities, causing fl oods of internal migration which increases com-
petition among employees but decreases labor cost. In the year of 1995, 
huge numbers of factory workers were dismissed and relegated to the 
category of “going off sentry duty.”2 This linguistic term is carefully 
chosen to avoid the unpleasant word “unemployment” —a phenom-
enon traditionally ascribed by the Party to capitalist societies. Parallel to 
an increasing demand for higher wages, there is an ever widening gap 
between the rich and the poor. People have to confront the inequality 
of wages and incomes in socialist China. A report from the Bureau of 
Labor and Social Security (an offi cial organizer that registers the gradual 
change and increase of various professions) shows that there are mainly 
264 kinds of occupations, among which chairmen of the board of direc-
tors have the highest income, with an average annual income of 211,678 
RMB. At the other pole are those average factory workers, whose best 
annual income is no more than 20,000 RMB. These people include 
workers in grinding mills, butchers, textile workers, printing workers, 
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tailors, sewing workers, poultry raisers, and dustmen (Ling 444). One 
of the sensational news items that became a topic of discussion at the be-
ginning of 2002 is a “story” that describes over-production in the milk 
industry in the cities of Chengdu and Nanjing. A news reporter gave 
the following description: “sweet milk fl ows all about in the milk factory 
with abundance of foam. To our dismay, it fl ows down the drain.” In 
spite of its superfi cial impression of an unprecedented economic boom, 
the Chinese see no poetic ambiguity in this fi ctional narrative. As an 
offi cial report shows, the annual consumption of milk of an average 
Chinese is only 7.2 kilograms, a fi gure only one twelfth of the average 
consumption level in the world, and only one thirty-sixth of that in the 
developed countries. Such a ratio, together with the fabricated story of 
milk abundance, easily recalls the citizens’ memories of Marx’s descrip-
tion of the simultaneous occurrence of overproduction on the one hand 
and extreme poverty on the other. If this dramatic picture of milk pro-
duction is a random occurrence that fails to represent the real picture 
of social stratifi cation in current China, the following fi gures registered 
by the government might be more suffi cient to capture what lies under-
neath the social transformation. The Minister of the Bureau of Labor 
and Social Security reported at the beginning of 2001 that people who 
received unemployment insurance payments numbered 1,900,000 in 
the year 2000; astonishingly, the fi gure increased to 3,500,000 in 2001; 
the minister predicted that it would escalate to 5,000,000 in the year 
2002. More signifi cantly, people became aware of a brutal fact: those of-
fi cial statistics have intentionally or unintentionally excluded those who 
are not only jobless but also deprived of insurance of any sort. When the 
government issued a regulation entitled “life security on the minimum 
level,” the hard fact of social poverty and unemployment was offi cially 
recognized. While big cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou 
present an almost internationalized standard of life, a trip around neigh-
borhoods reveal that such a picture of normalization and development 
only represents part of the reality. Nevertheless, we should not regard 
these inequalities as illusions of development. As is already recognized, 
“the geographical differences in the global economy are not signs of 
the co-presence of different stages of development but lines of the new 
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global hierarchy of production” (Hardt and Negri 288); similarly, the 
uneven economic development and its relatively backward lifestyle in 
China are largely determined by the internal political and social struc-
ture. In short, the Chinese are forced to confront the increasing expan-
sion of capitalism in China. Instead of falling too easily into two bad 
alternatives—either a socialist China or capitalist China—the Chinese 
began to accept Chinese modernization as part of the uneven develop-
ment of global capitalism. 
Despite the increasing unevenness in the country’s economic develop-
ment, people’s lifestyle, or, better said, their desire for a better life, shows 
a tendency towards normalization. One of many social facts that mani-
fest this characteristic, the convergence of consumer tastes and prefer-
ences in everyday life is happening all over the country, changing peo-
ple’s traditional attitudes towards boundaries of nation-states. As typi-
cal in capitalist societies, consumerism is often symbolically expressed 
through various forms of entertainment. Body building, golf, tennis, 
traveling abroad are beginning to be regarded as affordable desires of the 
middle class in China and are being structured into the contemporary 
leisure activity of the privileged few. For most average citizens these de-
sires, often mediated through televised advertisements, are voluntarily 
or involuntarily treated as symbols that inform their relation with their 
social environment and social structure. In an attempt to analyze vari-
ous results of capitalist expansion, John Tomlinson says that it is not 
“just that capitalism defi nes and structures the global political economy, 
but that in the process it determines global culture: in the distribution 
of commercialized media products containing the ethos and values of 
corporate capitalism and consumerism” (82). In China, to be sure, one 
of the inevitable results of market economy is an emergence of conver-
gence in cultural production and consumption. The power of capital 
has always spilt over into other realms beyond the economic. In the city 
of Beijing, it is roughly estimated that for every 100 families there are 55 
air conditioners, 90 telephones, 85 refrigerators, 90 washing machines, 
and 120 color television sets. Entertainment can be pursued at home 
with more ease and comfort. Instead of going to the cinema, people can 
sit in their well-furnished homes, effortlessly enjoying VCD with Hi-Fi 
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or cable TV. Indeed life is improving dramatically. The older generation 
will never forget that 20 years ago the best that the rich and the privi-
leged could desire on the domestic market was to choose among three 
brands of bicycles and between two brands of expensive watches. Now, 
in the city of Beijing, one out of eight families owns a private car. With 
all these changes, the power of commodifi cation has in fact started to 
turn almost everything into objects of desire. Among various ads that 
intensify the desire to buy, those that promise beauty and health always 
catch the attention of those who desire images that are sexually appeal-
ing. The fi rst sex product shop named “Adam and Eve Health Care 
Center” appeared in the city of Beijing in 1992, causing a great shock 
among the people holding to older traditions. As Raymond Williams 
points out, politics is always embedded in “ways of life” and “structures 
of feeling” peculiar to places and communities (242). Indeed, advertise-
ments are changing people’s consciousness. As many critics have noted, 
a shocking advertisement might create greater economic benefi t. For in-
stance, hung in the front of a restaurant in Xi Ba He district of Beijing 
in the year 2002, was a big ad: “Rabbits Boiled alive, the fi rst superb 
restaurant in Beijing.” This not only brings more customers to the res-
taurant and thus more economic profi t, but also instigates their strong 
desire for entertainment. In other words, whatever attracts the public 
attention is immediately transformed into a commodity, which brings 
about more economic profi t. 
As mentioned above, if capitalism is generally perceived and pur-
sued as a materially better way of life by the majority of the Chinese, 
such a lifestyle is still restricted to the small, more affl uent sector of 
the country. It is generally agreed that although the majority are af-
fected by the expansion of capitalism, only those of the educated and 
informed middle class receive benefi ts. This social fact runs counter to 
the blueprint of a modern socialist China untouched by the known evils 
of Western capitalism. In order to check the rampant spread of con-
sumerism and commodifi cation within the country, social critics and 
intellectuals of a conservative inclination level their criticism at capital-
ist expansion. Ascribing almost all the social problems to the capital-
ist mode of production, they believe that if capitalist domination and 
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expansion are becoming more global, then resistance to the accelerat-
ing capitalist fl ows is necessary and important. This localist position 
is best evidenced in the rediscovery of Maoism and a renewed form of 
nationalism in the 90s. At the very beginning of the year 1990, the fa-
miliar image of Mao Zedong began to appear in various forms (min-
iature sculpture, photos, pictures, etc.) in shops, buses, and taxi-cars. 
Interestingly, old eulogizing songs dedicated to Mao were reproduced 
with modern technology and sold so well that they became new pop 
music. Such a revived interest found a quick response in the fi lm indus-
try. Film directors worked hard and produced a series of documentaries 
in the following two years, such as “The Great Kun Lun Mountain,” 
“Mao Zedong and His Son,” “Mao Zedong and His Countrymen,” and 
“The Creation of Heaven and Earth.” Diagnosed as a nostalgic wave of 
Mao’s anti-imperialist modernization project, such a rediscovery in fact 
refl ects some dissatisfaction with the emergent capitalist values, includ-
ing the government’s inability to regulate the dichotomy between the 
economic and the political. Deeply embedded within this discrepancy is 
the idea that China should re-establish local identities outside, and pro-
tected against, the global fl ow of capitalist economy. The anxieties about 
naming the Chinese modern—a capitalist China or a socialist China—
resurfaced as an issue, relegating economic development to a second-
ary position in the modernization project. In fact, the socialist/capital-
ist or Western/Chinese dichotomy has always been present throughout 
the process of modernization. Although critical of the Anti-Spiritual 
Pollution Campaign launched in 1984, the Party seems unwilling to 
recognize that capitalism is an economic-political order that accepts no 
territorial boundaries or limits. Nationalism is still maintained as a stra-
tegic weapon against capitalism. One striking instance of an extreme 
and narrow nationalism occurred when NATO bombed the Chinese 
Embassy in Yugoslavia on May 7th, 1999. Immediately after the event 
people in big cities, especially university students, shouted the slogan 
“Down with USA!” recalling familiar scenes in China thirty years ago. 
While political demonstrations were going on in the streets on that very 
day, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared a series 
of postponements, ranging from diplomatic interactions between Sino-
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US high offi cials to negotiations on issues such as weapon proliferation, 
arms control, international security, and human rights. It is not surpris-
ing at all that the government slipped back into a negative attitude to-
wards the WTO. A survey conducted by the China Social Investigation 
Offi ce on June 10th, 1999 shows that 48% of Chinese citizens believed 
that there should be no compromise concerning issues such as aviation, 
electronics, communication, and agriculture on the part of the govern-
ment in the interest of the nation. Underneath such a renewed concep-
tion of nationalist sentiments is the belief that globalization means capi-
talist Americanization—an international standardization that threatens 
Chinese cultural identity and national sovereignty. The old binary con-
struction of Chinese socialism and Western capitalism falls too easily 
into a choice between two alternatives: either submission to Western 
capitalist domination or a socialist China with the Party functioning as 
a sole agent of management. 
This does not mean that the power and mechanism of capital is de-
liberately neglected. In fact, it is well understood that capital constantly 
operates through a reconfi guration of the boundaries of the inside and 
the outside. What is fearfully recognized throughout its modern history 
is the fact that capitalism brings into the country not only economic 
transformation but also cultural and ideological forms that eventually 
replicate themselves in the non-capitalist society. Historically speaking, 
nationalism has always been narrowly understood as a synonym of na-
tional sovereignty throughout the modern history of China. Dr. Sun 
Yat-Sen is the foremost representative of nationalism as a weapon against 
Western capitalist and colonialist oppression. At that historical moment 
nationalism was in close association with the movement towards na-
tional liberation. Indeed, national sovereignty has played an important 
role in the country’s struggle against external domination, sustaining the 
traditional idea that China is a self-suffi cient civilization. When science 
and democracy were introduced during the May Fourth Movement as 
two fundamental vehicles that would move the country towards mod-
ernization, science was neglected by most of the Chinese intellectuals at 
the time. Despite their urgent call for liberation, the Chinese were slow 
to recognize that the clear-cut dichotomy between the Western and the 
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Chinese, the economic and the political, limited the country’s emanci-
patory possibilities. More importantly, perhaps, social critics failed to 
recognize that the progressive function in the idea of national sovereign-
ty is always accompanied by power structures of internal domination. 
Such a narrow perspective continued in post-revolutionary or post-1949 
China when the whole country was immersed in Mao Zedong’s anti-
imperialist modernization project. To some extent, the antagonism be-
tween Mao’s anti-imperialist discourse and his utopian desire for lib-
eration explains why the whole country responded so quickly to the 
fanaticism of the Great Leap Forward Movement. Although critics after 
the Cultural Revolution often ascribed the country’s economic back-
wardness to Mao’s voluntarism and the fetishism of politics, it should 
be pointed out that Mao’s blueprint for a new China represented a self-
assured ethnocentrism due to its relative isolation from, and consider-
able ignorance of, the technological power of the capitalist countries. 
Whether we should interpret Mao’s socialist discourse as an antagonism 
between anti-imperialism and modernization or a double discourse that 
combines the political with the economic remains an issue that invites 
further debate. But what has been generally agreed upon over the nation 
is that just as we should not accept a globalization as a function of eco-
nomics, it is equally undesirable to accept nationalism in its extreme 
geopolitical term. This does not mean that nationalism is dying out as 
an old category. As a form of resistance against global capitalist hege-
mony, nationalism should be reexamined in the broad confi guration 
of globalization in indigenous culture and economic politics. The term 
“socialist market with Chinese characteristics” is built up to capture the 
idea of hybridity under capitalist globalization. Despite all the contra-
dictions, the idea of a socialist market is constructed with the purpose of 
making a new China while avoiding various social problems confront-
ing developed capitalist countries. What happened in the wake of the 
embassy bombing perhaps illustrates the wide acceptance of such an 
idea. About two months after the incident, quite a number of students 
majoring in computer science put forward a slogan “Resist American 
products except computer software!” However, after their furious dem-
onstrations in front of the US embassy, they returned to their prepara-
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tion for the TOEFL test. Those who work in joint ventures suffered a 
similar dilemma. They simply did not know whether it was ethnocentri-
cally right to work for American companies when nationalism was ad-
vanced nation-wide as a powerful strategy against Americanization. In 
living with all the ambiguities in relation with the idea of globalization, 
the government seems to make it clear that what China needs is mate-
rial or technological exchange internationalized, but political exchange 
localized. Globalization is still ideologically and politically suspicious.
The question of production in relation to power and desire has had 
a similar impact on universities in China. With a general anxiety over 
the so-called job crisis the humanities in academia are no longer popular 
with students. Of several factors responsible for this phenomenon, a pri-
mary one comes from some obvious change of policies in the national 
educational system that marginalize the humanities so that resources can 
be shifted to the applied sciences. In Beijing Normal University, where 
I work, it was proposed by the administrative branch that the study of 
Russian and Soviet literature should give way to more “important” sub-
jects. Although culture is a heated topic of discussion in academia, it is 
being driven out of universities before it is fi nally reincorporated into 
the industry of entertainment and consumer activities. Course enroll-
ment, as well as degree of production, are carefully examined in terms of 
economic losses and gains. Invariably, PhD placement is regarded as one 
important signal that determines the academic rank of a university as 
well as a channel that attracts fi nancial support from the government. As 
is happening outside China, scholarship and academic achievement are 
strictly measured by quantifi ed publication and citation records. While 
scholars are indoctrinated by the dictum “publish or perish,” publishing 
houses, academic journals, and university presses are downsizing aca-
demic publication so that they can be commercially self-supporting. In 
spite of all sorts of complaints, education is becoming an industry that 
changes the traditional academic out-look. Indeed, the condition for 
capital is wage labor. As an important part of the labor force, university 
teachers have to confront a contractually-limited employment, which 
is now being carried out in elite universities such as Peking University 
and Beijing Normal University. In Peking University, teachers without 
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PhD degrees under the age of 45 cannot apply for professorships; those 
who fail to publish enough (strictly quantifi ed) will be either dismissed 
or transferred to work in ancillary service departments of the university, 
such as cleaning and housing management. It is claimed that such a 
reform is a better idea than the tenure policy in American universities.
While these transformations in different spheres of the society great-
ly dissolve the traditional self-assured ethnocentrism and self-suffi cient 
civilization, they have also created various social problems, which are 
ascribed by the conservatives to the rise of capitalism and invasion of 
transnational corporations. In a sense, transnational capitalism func-
tions to sustain the myth of nationalism. As is generally agreed upon, 
globalization “would not have happened in the way it has without the 
US operating as both a driving force and a supervisory agent of the 
whole process” (Harvey 68-69). What China experienced (as an impor-
tant lesson) in its application for a membership within WTO before 
November 10, 2001, is that the politics of a global market is in fact 
nothing but what US foreign policy tries to achieve. This convinced 
its citizens that global capitalism might in one way or another be a he-
gemonic American capitalism that threatens national identity.3 In op-
position to the neo-liberalist party among Chinese intellectuals, the 
Neo-Leftists believe that globalization has already made the Chinese 
weaker opponents of capitalist countries. With their traumatic memory 
of imperialist invasion and oppression, people of conservative inclina-
tion argue that the global entails homogenization and undifferentiated 
national identity, whereas the local preserves heterogeneity and differ-
ence. In an attempt to look for factors that are believed to be responsible 
for social problems, some ascribe them to the confl icts and contradic-
tions within the practice of the “socialist market system.” From what 
has been experienced in the past two decades, people believe that the 
incompatibility between China’s political system and market economy 
not only presents an obstacle to economic development but also breeds 
corruption on various levels. The National Commission for Inspecting 
Discipline was surprised to fi nd that corruption cases (bribe-taking) 
placed on fi le for investigation in the year 1995 amounted to 122,476 
in total. And even average Chinese citizens know that reality goes far 
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beyond this rather conservative estimation. To a large extent, this is also 
one important reason that explains an increasingly heated discussion on 
the possibility of political reform. Although the Party completed, at the 
beginning of the 80s, the project of promoting household-based agricul-
ture, socialist modernization has been conducted under the imperative 
that the Party determines the country’s political reform. While the Party 
practices the old orthodox Marxism, which regards private ownership as 
the root cause of exploitation, it neglects the power structure of internal 
domination and exploitation in its political structure. Although the eco-
nomic infl ation in 1987-1988 revealed that exclusive state ownership, 
as means of production, can give rise to exploitation, which generated 
the idea of “sinifi cation of Marxism” in the Chinese cultural space, po-
litical inequality still remains a burning issue. And, more signifi cantly, 
this cannot be resolved by any paradigm of economic development. As 
is known, the political structural inequality in China determines a cor-
rupting exchange between power and wealth. One cannot overempha-
size the importance of economic globalization, as privatization under 
the present Chinese situation will inevitably legalize this exchange and 
protect the politically and economically privileged. Generally speaking, 
attitudes towards globalization in relation to the Chinese cultural space 
are polarized between a position which holds to a demand for a com-
pletely economically determined market and a position that privileges 
political equality over capitalist privatization. Underneath such a one-
sided view towards the dialectical relations between the economic and 
the cultural is a dangerous persistence in seeing the US as the ultimate 
authority that rules over the process of globalization. Instead of seeing 
capitalism as an economic-political order that accepts no boundaries or 
limits across time, the government still clings to the idea of economic 
globalization, as if globalization is a function of economics, as if Chinese 
socialist market system can be protected against the multidimensional 
consequentiality of capitalist power. 
But should we exaggerate the degree of helplessness in the face of 
the contemporary crisis between economic development and social con-
fl icts? Does the increasing availability and use of information technol-
ogy in China mean that its average citizens will not be distanced from 
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“facts?” While I was brooding over these questions in summer 2003, 
the press was full of reports and reviews about how China defeated the 
invisible SARS enemy and won a great victory. Instead of probing deep 
into the serious defi ciency of the country’s bureaucratic political system 
and the danger of consumerism, the press focuses on a series of publica-
tions and celebrations, eulogizing the power of nationalism. This might 
be symbolically interpreted as a collective response to the WHO’s preju-
diced description of China as a SARS nation at the peak of SARS oc-
currence. However, what was witnessed and experienced by the country 
during the period has shown its average citizens the inherent “uneven-
ness” of globalization as well as China’s socialist modernization. At least, 
people will start to learn that the process of globalization operates para-
doxically through diversity and unevenness.
In such conditions, what should we do as Chinese intellectuals? If 
globalization or transnational capitalism is unavoidable, capital will in-
evitably saturate the space in which culture is organized and produced. 
Therefore, we must take into consideration both the material and the 
spiritual. It seems to me that the present Chinese situation must be un-
derstood from both internal and external situations of history, for the 
inherent “unevenness” is determined by various factors diachronically 
and synchronically. Our task is, I think, to map the effects of globaliza-
tion in the cultural space of China and analyze China’s differences from, 
and links with, the world system or global capitalism. Now that the 
center of world capitalism, the United States, is having its own prob-
lems (the war in Iraq is a striking example), we must reconsider the tra-
jectory of Chinese modernization as well as our lived experience that 
I have described above, which constitute the complex feelings of the 
Chinese people. The current nostalgia of ordinary Chinese for Mao’s 
era is not without reasons, particularly if we think there are two villages 
(Nanjiecun and Liuzhuang) that are still operating successfully in the 
form of people’s communes even in the market system. I believe that to 
describe and analyze all of this would make a contribution to the social 
reformations in China, which would also be a benefi t to the people of 
the world. 
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Notes
 1 The idea that “Consumerism is the motivating force for the development of 
production” became popular after Deng Xiaoping’s talks during his southern 
excursions in February 1992. See Zhou Guanwu, “Consumerism Serves as the 
Motivating Force for the Development of Production.” 
 2 Statistics in this aspect are diffi cult to obtain due to the ideological con-
straints and attitudinal variations among municipal institutions. The National 
Commission for Inspecting Discipline presents an unemployment rate as 25% 
while the National Statistics Bureau proclaims that it is only 20% (Ling 222).
 3 The debate between Neo-Leftist and Liberalist, as currently named in China, is 
regarded as one of the most important cultural debates among intellectuals in 
the 90s. For a detailed description of the issue, see Luo, Chapter 6. 
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